Working Paper 111 - Assessing Absolute and Relative Pro-Poor Growth: An Application to the MENA Region by Sami Bibi et al.
                    
N
o 111 - July 2010 
Assessing Absolute and Relative 
Pro-Poor Growth:  
An Application to the MENA Region 
 
 
Sami Bibi, Jean-Yves Duclos and Audrey Verdier-Chouchane 





Correct citation:  Bibi, Sami;  Duclos, Jean-Yves;  Verdier-Chouchane, Audrey (2010), Assessing Absolute and 
Relative Pro-Poor Growth: An Application to the MENA Region, Working Papers Series N° 111, African 
Development Bank, Tunis, Tunisia. 
Editorial Committee  
Kamara, Abdul B. (Chair) 
Anyanwu, John C. 
Aly, Hassan Youssef 
Rajhi, Taoufik 
Vencatachellum, Désiré  
Salami, Adeleke 
Moummi, Ahmed  
Coordinators  
Copyright © 2010  
African Development Bank 
Angle des l’avenue du Ghana et des rues 
Pierre de Coubertin et Hédi Nouira  
BP 323 -1002 TUNIS Belvédère (Tunisia)  
Tél: +216 71 333 511  
Fax: +216 71 351 933  
E-mail: afdb@afdb.org  
 
Rights and Permissions  
All rights reserved.  
The text and data in this publication may be 
reproduced as long as the source is cited. 
Reproduction for commercial purposes is 
forbidden.  
The Working Paper Series (WPS) is produced 
by the Development Research Department 
of the African Development Bank. The WPS 
disseminates the findings of work in progress, 
preliminary research results, and development 
experience and lessons, to encourage the 
exchange of ideas and innovative thinking 
among researchers, development 
practitioners, policy makers, and donors. The 
findings, interpretations, and conclusions 
expressed in the Bank’s WPS are entirely 
those of the author(s) and do not necessarily 
represent the view of the African Development 
Bank, its Board of Directors, or the countries 
they represent.  
Working Papers are available online at 













Assessing Absolute and Relative Pro-Poor 
Growth:  
An Application to the MENA Region 
 
 






















AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK GROUP 
Working Paper No. 111 
July 2010 
Office of the Chief Economist  
(1)  Sami Bibi , Jean-Yves Duclos and Audrey Verdier-Chouchane are, respectively,  Research Fellow and Deputy 
Leader at the Poverty and Economic Policy (PEP) Research Network, Université Laval, Canada ; Professor, 
Département d'économique and CIRPEE, Université Laval, Canada, and Institut d'Anàlisi Economica (CSIC), 
Spain; and  Principal Research Economist at the African Development Bank, Tunisia. This work was carried out 
with support from the Poverty and Economic Policy Research Network, which is financed by the Government of
Canada through the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) and the Canadian International
Development Agency (CIDA), and by the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID). The paper
was inspired by the “Growth, Poverty and Inequality” study conducted by the Development Research 
Department of the African Development Bank. The authors are grateful to Abdel-Rahmen El-Lahga and Naouel 








Sami Bibi, Jean-Yves Duclos and Audrey Verdier-Chouchane 
 
 
This paper proposes a multidimensional test 
for a partial ordering over absolute and 
relative pro-poor judgements. It also 
investigates whether poverty comparisons 
can be made over classes of indices that 
incorporate both absolute and relative 
poverty standards. Besides being robust to 
whether pro-poor judgements should be 
absolute or relative, the partial ordering is 
also robust to choosing over a class of 
weights to aggregate the impact of growth 
on the poor, as well as over ranges of 
absolute and relative poverty lines. The test 
is applied to recent distributional changes in 
nine Middle-Eastern and North-African 
(MENA) countries that have witnessed 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The assessment of whether distributional changes are “pro-poor” has become 
increasingly important in the last decade (See inter alia, Bourguignon 2003; Dollar and 
Kraay 2002; Eastwood and Lipton 2001; Ravallion  2001; United Nations 2000; and the 
World Bank 2002).  
 
Doing this calls for the fixing of the concept of pro-poorness, which is usually related to 
the idea that the poor get “more” from growth than some predefined benchmark. An 
important issue is whether this benchmark should be absolute or relative. Another issue is 
whether pro-poor judgements should use distributional weights that vary across the poor, 
and where to draw the poverty line (in absolute or in relative terms). 
 
In carrying out such an exercise, caution is needed for several reasons. First, the link 
between growth and changes in poverty can be sensitive to the choice of poverty lines 
and poverty indices. For instance, even if the incomes of the poor always increased in 
line with average growth in the economy, the impact of growth on the headcount ratio (a 
popular choice among many possible poverty indices) would depend on the income 
density around the poverty line, and thus on the choice of that poverty line. Other poverty 
indices will almost always vary quantitatively from the headcount, and they may 
sometimes also move in a qualitatively opposite direction. 
 
Secondly, the impact of growth on absolute poverty is often different from its impact on 
relative poverty and relative inequality. Indeed, although positive income growth usually 
reduces the absolute incomes of the poor, it does not have a systematic effect on their 
shares in total income. This can have immediate repercussions on whether growth can be 
unambiguously considered to be pro-poor. The reason is that the two leading views on 
how to make judgements of pro-poorness differ radically as to whether growth should be 
expected to change the incomes of the poor by at least some absolute amount — for 
absolute pro-poor views — or by at least some proportional amount — for relative pro-
poor views.  
 
For instance, the absolute pro-poor view will judge as equally pro-poor, the following 
two changes in an income distribution: 1) The first one shows an increase of $1 in the 
incomes of everyone; 2) the second one shows an increase of $1 in the incomes of the 
poor and an increase of $10,000 in the incomes of everyone else. This is because the 
absolute pro-poor view attaches no weight to the relative impact of growth. Conversely, 
the relative pro-poor view will judge as equally pro-poor, two changes in an income 
distribution, a first one in which everyone sees his income fall by 50 percent, and a 
second one in which everyone sees his income increase by 50 percent. This is because the 
relative pro-poor view only considers the relative impact of growth. 
 
To assess whether growth is pro-poor, previous literature have often first distinguished 
between absolute and relative pro-poorness, and then focused on summary pro-poor 
measures with fixed poverty lines and with separate absolute and relative settings. Recent 
influential examples include Dollar and Kraay (2002), Kakwani, Khandker, and Son  
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(2003), Kakwani and Pernia (2000), Klasen (2004), and Ravallion and Chen (2003). See 
also Araar, Duclos, Audet, and Makdissi (forthcoming) for a review.  
 
This paper follows a different route by investigating how pro-poor judgements can be 
made robust to the choice of pro-poor evaluation functions and to the choice of poverty 
lines, in a joint absolute and relative setting. This is in the spirit of Sen’s (1981) view that 
it may not be desirable to choose between the two settings, and that the two may be 
useful to assess whether development is being pro-poor or not: 
 
“Indeed, there is an irreducible core of absolute deprivation in our idea of  
poverty, which translates reports of starvation, malnutrition and visible 
hardship into a diagnosis of poverty without having to ascertain first the 
relative picture. Thus, the approach of relative deprivation supplements 
rather than supplants the analysis of poverty in terms of absolute 
dispossession.” (Sen 1981, p.17) 
 
 
We investigate absolute and relative pro-poorness by considering classes of pro-poor 
evaluation functions that can show varying distribution-sensitivity to the assessment of 
the impact of growth, be it in an absolute or in a relative setting. This is done in the spirit 
of the poverty dominance literature, and it also allows for the consideration of the ranges 
of possible poverty frontiers within which to define the sets of the poor, absolutely and 
relatively. 
 
The rest of the paper runs as follows. Section 2 formalises this paper's assessment of the 
pro-poorness of growth, using both relative and absolute standards. Section 3 applies the 
techniques. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2.  Assessing Absolute and Relative Pro-Poorness 
 
We start Section 2.1 by drawing from the structure and the results of Duclos, Sahn, and 
Younger (2006) on making general poverty comparisons based on multidimensional 
indicators of welfare. Section 2.2 then describes how this general framework can be 
adapted to the important special case of comparing absolute and relative poverty using 
monetary indicators such as income or consumption. Section 2.3 provides a graphical 
discussion of the results. 
 
2.1  The General Setting 
 
Let a distribution of absolute (a) and relative (r) welfare indicators be given by F 
j(a, r) at 
time  j,  j = A, B. These indicators can themselves be based on any variable (or 
combinations of variables) of interest, such as consumption, income, wealth, education or 
health, on which we would like to assess the impact of growth and distributional changes 





















      ( 1 )  
 
This is a summary indicator of the overall degree of joint absolute and relative welfare of 
an individual with (a, r). Note that the derivative conditions in (1) mean that both 
absolute and relative welfare can each contribute to increasing overall welfare.  
 
We then assume that we wish to compute an aggregate index of overall deprivation based 
on the joint distribution of a and r, and that we wish to focus on those with the greatest 
degree of overall deprivation. This can be done by drawing a frontier to separate those 
with lower and greater welfare. We can think of this frontier as a series of points at which 
overall welfare is kept constant. The frontier is assumed to be defined implicitly by a 
locus of the form λ(a, r) = 0. The set of those over whom we want to aggregate overall 
deprivation is then obtained as: 
 
Λ(λ) = {(a, r) |(λ(a, r) ≤  0 }         ( 2 )  
 
Consider Figure 1 (see appendix) with thresholds za and zr in dimensions of indicators a 
and r. λ1(a, r) gives an “intersection” view of joint deprivation. It considers one to be 
totally deprived only if he/she is deprived in both of the dimensions a and r, and if he/she 
therefore lies within the dashed rectangle of Figure 1. All of those within that dashed 
rectangle will then be considered deprived according to that view. Since this measure of 
deprivation will have an important role to play for testing dominance, we will refer to it 
as an intersection headcount of joint deprivation, defined jointly over absolute and 
relative welfare as: 
 
∫ ≤ ≤ = ). , ( ) ( ) ( ) , ( r a dF z r I z a I z z H
j
r a r a
j
      ( 3 )  
 
Thus,  ) , ( r a
j z z H  expresses the number of those who are deprived in both a and r as a 
proportion of j's total population. 
 
Other views and frontiers of joint deprivation can also be applied. λ2(a, r) (the L-shaped 
dotted line in Figure 1) gives a “union” frontier. It considers an individual to be overall 
deprived if the person is deprived in either of the two dimensions, and if he/she therefore 
lies below or to the left of the dotted line. Finally, λ3(a, r) provides an intermediate 
approach. According to that approach, one can be overall deprived even if r > zr, so long 
as his/her a value is sufficiently low to lie to the left of λ3(a, r) = 0.  
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We represent indices of overall deprivation by P
j(π, λ,) for distribution j. We focus on 
classes of overall deprivation indices that are additive across individuals. An additive 
deprivation index that combines the two dimensions of welfare can be defined generally 
as:  
∫∫ Λ =
) ( ), , ( ) ; , ( ) , (
λ λ π λ π r a dF r a P
j j
       ( 4 )  
 
π(a, r; λ) is the contribution to overall deprivation of an individual with absolute and 
relative welfare given by a and r. 
 
We will say that the movement from distribution A to distribution B is pro-poor if and 
only if P
A (π, λ) ≥ P
B (π, λ). Clearly, whether the change will be deemed pro-poor will 
depend on the way in which λ, π, a and r are chosen. One of the main objectives of this 
paper is indeed to show how assessments of pro-poorness can be robust to some of these 
choices. 
 
Let us for now assume that a choice of indicators a and r has been made. Assume first for 
simplicity that π in (4) is left differentiable with respect to a and r. Denote by π
a and π
r, 
the first-order derivatives (which include the effect of a and r on λ(a, r)) of π (a, r; λ(a, 
r)) with respect to a and r. Let π
ar be the derivative of π
a with respect to r. We can then 
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   ( 5 )  
 
The first line of (5) says that an index P(π, λ) in Π(λ
+) can add up the deprivation of all 
possible sets Λ(λ) of deprived individuals so long as they are part of a larger set Λ(λ
+). 
The second line of (5) says that those with (a, r) just at the deprivation frontier λ(a, r) = 0 
do not contribute to total deprivation in the population. Said differently, the measure π(a, 
r; λ) is continuous in (a, r) at λ(a, r) = 0. The third line of (5) says that an increase in 
either a or r decreases deprivation. Finally, the last line of (5) says that an increase in a 
increases π
r (a, r; λ). The greater the value of a, the lower the fall in deprivation that is 
brought about by an increase in r. This also says that the types of deprivation are 
“substitutes”. 
 
Let ΔP (π, λ) = P
B (π, λ) − P
A (π, λ) and ΔH (za , zr) = H
B (za , zr) − H
A (za , zr). Using 
Duclos, Sahn, and Younger (2006), we can show the following equivalence: 
 
Proposition 1 (Joint absolute and relative pro-poor dominance) 
 
) ( ) , ( , 0 ) , (
) ( ) , (    0,     )   , (  
+
+
Λ ∈ ∀ < Δ
Π ∈ ∀ < Δ
λ
λ λ π λ π
r a r a z z z z H iff
P P
       ( 6 )   
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Proposition 1 says that to be able to conclude that joint absolute/relative deprivation is 
lower in distribution B than in distribution A for all indices in Π(λ
+), it is necessary and 
sufficient that the intersection headcount H (za , zr) be lower in B for all of the possible 
poverty lines (za , zr) in Λ(λ
+). 
 
2.2   Absolute and Relative Deprivation in the Income Dimension 
 
The result of Proposition 1 shows how to make pro-poor judgements that are robust to 
specifications of π and λ. This still leaves open the choice of the a and r indicators. The 
most popular ways to assess absolute and relative welfare and poverty/deprivation are 
based on the use of income (or consumption). This is also what will be done in the 
application section below. Denoting income as y, we can therefore express a and r as 
functions a 
j (y) and r 
j (y). The superscripts j expresses the possible dependence of these 
functions on the distribution j, in which the incomes are observed. a 
j (y) and r 
j (y) 
therefore stand for the absolute and relative welfare of someone with income y in a 
distribution j. We then have: 
 
∫ Λ =
) ( ). ( ) ); ( ), ( ( ) , (
λ λ π λ π y dF y r y a P
j j j j
      ( 7 )  
 
In pursuing this route, it is useful to ensure that the aggregation procedure described in 
(7) incorporates both absolute and relative standards of income deprivation. A formal 
treatment of such standards is provided in Duclos (2009). It is also sometimes argued that 
a change is good for the poor if it increases the absolute living standards of the poor (see 
Ravallion and Chen 2003 for instance). This is the main justification for thinking about 
incorporating concerns for absolute welfare in the pro-poor judgements. It is also 
sometimes posited that growth should be judged to be pro-poor only if it benefits more, 
or harms less, the poor than the non-poor (see Kakwani and Pernia 2000 for instance). 
This is the main motivation for incorporating relative welfare concerns in the pro-poor 
judgements. 
 
Take the case of absolute welfare, again captured by the function a 
j (y). The following 
axiom serves to specify it. 
 
Axiom 1 a 
j (y) incorporates concerns for absolute welfare if and only if 
 
∫ ∫ = ) ( ) ); ( ), ( ( ) ( ) ); ( ), ( ( y dF y r y a y dF y r y a
j j i j j j λ π λ π
 for all possible distributions F 
i 
(y) and F 
j (y). 
 
Axiom 1 says that pro-poor judgements should remain invariant to whether we use a 
i (y) 
or a 
j (y) to take into account concerns for absolute welfare in assessing P 
j (π, λ). This is 
an invariance property that essentially forces the function a 
j (y) not to depend on j; said 
differently, we should have that a(y) = a 
j (y). Given the general formulation of the 
function π, we can, without loss of generality, therefore just set a 
j (y) = y.  
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Now take the case of relative welfare, which is captured by the function r 
j (y). It will 
generally take into account the distribution of income F 
j (·) when it comes to assess the 
relative welfare of someone with y in j. That will also allow taking into account the 
change in the distribution of income when assessing by how much the incomes of the 
poor must change to “catch up” with the change in the overall distribution of income. Let 
F 
j,γ (y) = F 
j (γy) and r 
j,γ (y) be defined relative to the distribution F 
j,γ (y). F 
j,γ (y) is thus 
obtained by scaling (dividing) the distribution of incomes in j by γ. 
 
Axiom 2 r 
j (y) incorporates relative welfare concerns if and only if, for all γ > 0, 
 
∫ ∫ = ) ( ) ); ( , ( ) ( ) ); ( , (
, , y dF y r y y dF y r y
j j j j γ γ λ γ π λ π
 for all possible distributions F 
j (y). 
 
Axiom 2 assesses deprivation in two distributions: One with j's incomes, and the other 
with j's incomes divided by γ. If absolute welfare is adjusted to be the same in the two 
distributions (by multiplying y by γ), then Axiom 2 says that deprivation should result in 
similar judgement in the two distributions. In other words, pro-poor judgements should 
remain invariant to whether we use F 
j (y) or F 
j,γ (y) for aggregating relative welfare. 
Scaling incomes up or down should not affect relative welfare. This is an invariance 
property that essentially also forces the function r 
j (y) to be homogeneous of degree 0 in 
y and in the distribution of incomes F 
j (·). 
 
There are many ways for enforcing this homogeneity. One of the simplest ways is to 
normalise incomes in r 
j (y) by a summary statistic of the income distribution j, which is 
homogeneous of degree 1 in the income distribution. The mean is an obvious and 
common candidate to do this in the context of relative poverty comparisons, though other 
distribution statistics such as the median or the mode could also be applied. This is what 
we use in this paper's application in Section 3 in accordance with most of the existing 
literature on assessing relative pro-poorness. Letting the mean of distribution j be µ 
j = 
∫ ) (y ydF
j , this is formally equivalent to imposing the following axiom. 
 
Axiom 3 r 
j (y) is defined as mean-normalised relative welfare if and only if, for all γ > 0, 
 
∫ ∫ = ) ( ) ); ( , ( ) ( ) ); ( , (
, y dF y r y y dF y r y
j j j j j μ λ μ π λ π
 for all possible distributions F 
j (y), 
and where r(y) is independent of the distribution F 
j (·). 
 
Given the general formulation of the function π, without loss of generality, we can set r 
j 
(y) = y/µ 
j. Note that this framework is general enough to accommodate negative as well 
as positive income growth. This leads to joint absolute/relative indices of the form: 
 
∫ Λ =
) ( ) ( ) ; / , ( ) , (
λ λ μ π λ π y dF y y P
j j j
       ( 8 )  
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2.3   Comparing Absolute and Relative Income Deprivation 
 
Using (3), (8) and Proposition 1, we therefore have that ΔP (π, λ) < 0, ) ( ) , (
+ Π ∈ ∀ λ λ π P  
(where the P are absolute/relative income deprivation indices) if and only if ΔH∗ (z a , z r) 
< 0,  ) ( ) , (
+ Λ ∈ ∀ λ r a z z , where  
 






     ( 9 )  
 
The fact that both a and r depend solely on y leads to a simplification of the general 
testing procedure described in Proposition 1. To see this, consider Figure 2 (see 
appendix). Absolute income is shown on the horizontal axis (y), and relative income is 
shown on the vertical one (y/µ). The lines j = A and j = B show where incomes lie for the 
two distributions. The slope of each line is given by 1/µ 
j. Testing for joint absolute and 
relative deprivation amounts to comparing the proportion of individuals lying within a 
rectangle that starts at (0, 0) and that ends at (z a , z r). 
 
First assume that mean income has increased in moving from A to B, as is also implicitly 
assumed in Figure 2. Because individuals are concentrated on the lines A and B, marginal 
dominance in each dimension can be quite informative of bivariate dominance. Marginal 
dominance can be checked by comparing F 
j,1 (z a) at different z a, for checking absolute 
welfare dominance, and by comparing F 
j,µj (z r ) at various z  r for assessing relative 
welfare dominance. This leads to some interesting relationships (again, for the case in 
which µ 
A < µ 
B). 
 
1.  First assume, as in Figure 2, that F 
B,µB (z r) ≤ F 
A,µA (z r) for z r Є ]0, z
0
r]. This 




r) = F 
B (z
0







a) in Figure 2 is the 




is the proportion of individuals in population A, who are lying on segment oc. 
Also assume that F 
B,µB (z r) > F 
A,µA (z r) for z r > z
0
r. Then, it must be that F 
B (z 
a) ≤ F 
A (z a) for z a Є ]0, µ 
A z
0





a in Figure 2. It must indeed 
also be that ΔH∗ (z a, z r) < 0 for all (z a , z r) in ]0, ∞[⊗]0, z
0
r]. Therefore, if a 
distribution B with a higher mean than A relatively dominates A, then it must also 
be that B dominates A over some Π(λ), which is the dashed area on Figure 2. 
 
2.  Suppose in addition that F 
B (z a) ≤ F 
A (z a) for z a Є ]0, z
1
a], and that F 
B (z a) > F 
A (z a) for z a > z
1




a. It must then also be that 
ΔH∗ (z a , z r) < 0 for all (z a, z r) in ]0, z
0
a]⊗]0, ∞]. In this case, Λ(λ) is the dotted 
area on Figure 2. 
 




a, where ΔH∗ (za, z 
r) < 0. This is the shaded area on Figure 2 . It is bounded to the right by the line 
that links point d to point e. 
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4.  To sum up, if µ 
A < µ 
B and if for some z
0
r we have that F 
B,µB (z r) ≤ F 
A,µA (z r) for 
zr Є ]0, z
0
r], we also have that ΔH∗ (z a, z r) < 0, over the area Λ(λ 
+), shown 
jointly by the dashed, the dotted, and the shaded areas in Figure 2. This also says 
that all of the indices that are members of the absolute/relative class Π(λ) will 
necessarily declare a movement from A to B to be pro-poor. 
 
A similar and symmetric reasoning applies to the case in which the movement from A to 
B generates a fall in average income. That is if µ 
A > µ 
B. If a distribution A with a higher 
mean than B relatively dominates B, then it must also be that A dominates B over some 
absolute/relative poverty indices Π(λ 
+). This also says that all of the indices that are 
members of the absolute/relative class Π(λ 








The methodology presented above is applied to relatively recent distributional changes in 
nine Middle-Eastern and North-African (MENA) countries
i. The welfare distributions are 
obtained by reconstructing individual expenditure observations from information on 
cumulative expenditure shares, namely Lorenz curve coordinates. Most of these 
cumulative expenditure shares are available on the World Bank’s PovCalNet web site 
(http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/jsp). Lorenz curve ordinates have also been 
obtained from three other sources: El-Laithy and Abu-Ismail (2005) for Syria in 1997 and 
2003; Ministère des Affaires Economiques et du Développement (Ministry of Economic 
Affairs and Development) (2006) for the 2004 Mauritanian expenditure distribution; and 
Institut National de la Statistique (National Institue of Statistics) (2007) for 2005 
Tunisian cumulative expenditure shares.  
 
The procedure followed is that suggested by Shorrocks and Wan (2008) which, in 
contrast to several alternative methods, ensures that the characteristics of the 
reconstructed samples match exactly the Lorenz curve ordinates that are used
ii. The 
procedure is applied to nine countries that have experienced different patterns of growth 
and poverty changes. These countries are Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, 
Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, and Yemen. The covered periods range from 1993 to 2007. 
 
To compare poverty across time and countries, we need measurement units that are 
comparable across time and space. This is readily provided by the PovCalNet data. For 
the  per capita expenditure data obtained from sources other than PovcalNet, we 
                                                 
i Mauritania and Turkey are not part of the MENA region in the World Bank's classification of countries. 
Other institutions do, however, sometimes include these two countries in the list of MENA countries since 
they are geographically close to the region. For example, Mauritania is classified as a North African 
country by the African Development Bank. 
ii For this purpose, we have used the latest version of the Distributive Analysis Stata Package (DASP) of 
Araar and Duclos (2007), which readily applies this procedure.  
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transform them into 2005 prices using the consumer price indices published by the 
national authorities of each country. We then convert these expenditures into 2005 US 
dollars using the 2005 purchasing power parities (PPP) found in PovcalNet for 
Mauritania and in World Bank (2008) for Syria and Tunisia. PPP are commonly used for 
comparing absolute poverty and social welfare. Such cross-country comparisons should 
nonetheless be interpreted with caution since they can be sensitive to marginal changes in 




3.2 Descriptive  Statistics 
 
Table 1 (see Appendix) provides descriptive statistics on average daily per capita 
expenditures across the countries, the incidence of absolute poverty (H∗ (z a, ∞)) for a 
poverty line z a set at “two dollars a day”, the incidence of relative poverty (H∗ (∞, z r)) 
for a poverty line z r set at half of mean expenditure, and the Gini index. The number of 
observations generated for the reconstructed samples is 500 in all cases. 
 
Table 1 shows that mean per capita expenditures in Mauritania and Yemen are not far 
from the conventional “two-dollar-a-day” poverty line. This largely explains the 
relatively high absolute poverty rates found in these two countries, relative to the others. 
With the exception of Mauritania, Yemen and Egypt in 2004, the MENA countries 
shown in Table 1 display moderate levels of absolute poverty rates since 2000, ranging 
from 7.4 percent of the population in 2005 in Iran, to 13 percent in 2007 in Morocco. 
These rates are far lower than the incidence of relative poverty. 
 
In most cases, countries have not witnessed a statistically significant change in both 
absolute and relative poverty. Iran has experienced a reduction of 0.2 points of 
percentage in the incidence of absolute poverty between 1998 and 2005, and a decline of 
7.8 points in the incidence of relative poverty. While the reduction of relative poverty in 
Iran is statistically significant, that of absolute poverty is not. Tunisia is the only country 
that has experienced a statistically significant reduction in both relative deprivation (-1.4 
points of percentage) and absolute poverty (-11.8 points of percentage). Yemen is the 
only country that has registered an increase in both absolute and relative poverty. 
 
Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Syria have experienced a decrease in their absolute poverty 
rates. However, their relative poverty rates have risen. The results prevent conventional 
first-order relative pro-poorness in these countries.  
 
Since the conditions are necessary for joint absolute and relative pro-poor dominance, 
they also prevent bidimensional pro-poorness over Λ(λ 
+). This is confirmed by the 
univariate stochastic dominance tests of Figure 13 for Egypt, Figure 15 for Jordan, Figure 
17 for Morocco and Figure 19 for Syria. On the left-hand side of each of these figures 
(see Appendix), absolute poverty incidence H 
j (z a, ∞) for country j at each of the two 
                                                 
iii See for example Chen, Datt, and Ravallion (1994) for a discussion of the use of PPP for international 
comparisons of poverty.  
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time periods is drawn at the top for different z a from 0 to 5 dollars a day, while absolute 
poverty differences, ΔH(z a), are plotted at the bottom for the same range of z a (along 
with 95% confidence intervals). On the right-hand side, the relative poverty headcount (H 
j (∞, z r)) is displayed at the top for different z r , starting from 0 to 100 percent of mean 
per capita expenditure (µ 
j) whereas relative poverty differences (ΔH 
j (z a)) are depicted 
at the bottom. 
 
3.3  Joint Absolute and Relative Pro-Poorness 
 
The bivariate stochastic dominance tests described in 6 are illustrated in Figure 4 for 
Tunisia, Figure 6 for Mauritania, Figure 8 for Iran, Figure 10 for Yemen, Figure 12 for 
Turkey, Figure 14 for Egypt, Figure 16 for Jordan, Figure 18 for Morocco, and Figure 20 
for Syria. The front axis shows the range of absolute poverty lines (z a), while the right 
axis shows the range of relative poverty lines (z r). The vertical axis shows the difference 
in the joint incidence of absolute and relative deprivation (ΔH∗ (z a, z r)) at the points 
defined in the (y, y/µ 
j) domain. If ΔH∗ (z a, z r) < 0,  ) ( ) , (
+ Λ ∈ ∀ λ r a z z , then economic 
growth has been unambiguously pro-poor in the sense that the change will be deemed 
pro-poor by any choice of poverty indices and poverty frontiers in the class Π(λ 
+). 
 
On the whole, three sets of countries stand out from the Figures. The first set includes 
Tunisia and, to a lesser extent, Iran and Mauritania. These countries have witnessed a 
robust fall in both absolute and relative poverty. The second set regroups Yemen and 
Turkey, which have experienced a rise in both absolute and relative deprivation. The 
remaining countries form the third set. They are Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Syria. They 
have witnessed a fall in one of the dimensions of deprivation and a rise in the other. 
 
3.3.1 Pro-poor growth experiences in Iran, Mauritania, and Tunisia 
 
The left-hand side of Figure 3 for Tunisia shows that ΔH∗ (z a, ∞) lies nowhere above 
zero (i.e., for z a < 5). Further, for any z a > 1, the negative values of ΔH∗ (z a, ∞) are 
statistically different from zero at the five percent level. The economic growth 
experienced by Tunisia between 1995 and 2005 has thus unambiguously decreased its 
level of absolute poverty, meaning that there is first-order absolute poverty dominance 
for Tunisia of 2005 over 1995
iv. Figure 5 shows that Mauritania has experienced a similar 
statistically significant fall in absolute poverty. 
 
The right-hand side of Figure 3 for Tunisia and of Figure 5 for Mauritania show that ΔH∗ 
(∞, z r) is not statistically distinguishable from zero for many of the z r Є [0, 1]. This 
means that it is not possible to infer relative poverty dominance over all of that range of 
zr. However, if we restrict the range of z  r to [0, 0.8] for Tunisia and [0, 0.4] for 
Mauritania, and we ignore sampling variability, then we can conclude that economic 
growth has unambiguously decreased relative poverty in Tunisia and Mauritania. 
                                                 
iv Poverty and inequality were, however, on the rise in Tunisia during the first half of the 1990s. More 
details can be found in Bibi and Nabli (2009).  
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Figure 7 shows a modest fall in Iranian absolute poverty between 1998 and 2005, which 
is too small for any z a Є [0, 2] to be confidently declared as statistically significant
v. The 
right-hand side of Figure 7 indicates, however, that Iran has experienced a statistically 
significant fall in relative poverty over the 1998-2005 period. This implies that although 
absolute poverty dominance cannot be inferred in Iran, the change between 1998 and 
2005 has been relatively pro-poor. 
The presence of dominance, both in the absolute and in the relative dimensions of 
welfare, has led to joint pro-poor dominance in Tunisia as Figure 4 shows. ΔH∗ (z a, z r) 
is either nil or negative. It is never positive for any couple of (z a, z r) in [0, 5] ⊗ [0, 0.8]. 
A similar result applies to Iran and Mauritania, but within a narrower range of za for the 
Iranian case and a narrower range of z  r for Mauritania. Ignoring sampling variability, 
Figure 8 for Iran indeed shows that there is bivariate pro-poor dominance of 2005 over 
1998 for any couple of (z a, z r) in [0, 2]⊗[0, 0.8], while Figure 6 shows that there is 
bivariate pro-poor dominance in Mauritania for any (z a, z r) in [0, 5] ⊗ [0, 0.4]. Putting it 
differently, the growth pattern in these three countries has mostly led to a two-edged 
impact on poverty: Increasing mean income of the poor and reducing income inequality. 
This has generated a lower degree of joint absolute/relative deprivation as measured by 
any index within Π(λ 
+). 
 
3.3.2  Anti-poor growth experiences in Turkey and Yemen 
 
Yemen shows a rather dissimilar pattern of distributional change. The severe decrease in 
mean expenditure per capita experienced by Yemen between 1998 and 2005 has robustly 
increased both absolute and relative deprivation, as Figure 9 shows. Thus, bivariate pro-
poor dominance tests are conclusive, but in the opposite direction, since ΔH∗ (z a, z r) in 
Figure 10 is positive at different values of H∗ (z a, z r). Yemen's economic recession has 
hurt the poor in both absolute and also relative terms, more than for the non-poor. This 




Unlike for the case of Yemen, Turkey's mean per capita expenditure, expressed in 2005 
PPP US dollars, grew from 6.8 dollars a day in 1994 to 7.8 dollars a day in 2005. 
Notwithstanding this, the distributional effects of Turkey's growth have been similar to 
those of Yemen. Figure 11 shows that Turkey has witnessed a statistically significant rise 
in relative poverty between 1994 and 2005, for values of z  r ranging from 20 to 60 
percent of mean income. The change in absolute poverty for any z  a lower than 
two dollars a day is estimated to be positive, although it is not, however statistically 
significant. Ignoring sampling variability, the joint effect is a robust rise in joint 
absolute/relative deprivation in Turkey between 1994 and 2005, as shown in Figure 12. 
 
                                                 
v Table 1 shows that the Iranian 0.2 point of percentage decline in the absolute incidence of poverty is not 
statistically significant.  
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3.3.3  Inconclusive effects of growth on poverty in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and 
Syria 
 
The left-hand side of Figure 13 for Egypt, Figure 15 for Jordan, Figure 17 for Morocco, 
and Figure 19 for Syria clearly show that ΔH∗ (z a, ∞) lies nowhere above zero (i.e., for z 
a < 5) in these four MENA countries. Further, for several, z  a < 5, ΔH∗ (z a, ∞) is 
negative with values that are statistically significant at the five percent level. Economic 
growth experienced by these countries during the last decade or so, has therefore tended 
to decrease absolute poverty. However, the right-hand side of these same Figures show 
that ΔH∗ (∞, z r) is either nil or (often) statistically greater than 0 for values of z r within 
[0, 1]. This indicates that we cannot conclude that the latter period dominates the earlier 
one in terms of relative poverty. 
 
The absence of first-order dominance in the relative dimension of welfare rules out 
bivariate pro-poor dominance, as illustrated in Figure 14 for Egypt, Figure 16 for Jordan, 
Figure 18 for Morocco, and Figure 20 for Syria. ΔH∗ (z a, z r) shows both positive and 
negative values, depending on the choice of (z a, z r). There is then no robust pro-poor 
judgment of the evolution of joint absolute and relative deprivation in these four 
countries, even if we ignore whether the values taken by ΔH∗ (z a, z r) are statistically 
different from 0. 
 
4.  Conclusion 
 
Poverty reduction has been brought to the fore of the analysis of the impact of growth on 
development. There is now a wide consensus that both the rate and the distributional 
impact of growth are important in assessing its developmental role. This paper offers a 
method to assess the joint absolute and relative distributive impact of growth through a 
bivariate test of growth pro-poorness. 
 
Using this method, we are able to reconcile the absolute and relative approaches to 
assessing poverty and to determine whether distributional changes have been robustly 
pro-poor or anti-poor in nine MENA countries in the last fifteen years. Some of the 
MENA countries, such as Tunisia and Mauritania, have seen robust decline in the joint 
absolute and relative deprivation. The situation is similar for Iran, but is statistically 
weak. Yemen and Turkey have experienced a rise in joint absolute and relative 
deprivation. Other countries (Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Syria) have witnessed a fall in 
absolute deprivation accompanied by a rise in relative deprivation. Results are therefore 
country-specific.  
 
Overall, the paper’s results suggest that it is important to focus on individual experiences 
when analysing the impact of growth. They also show that although economic growth 
often leads to a robust decline of absolute deprivation, it can also increase it, and that it 
can also simultaneously increase relative deprivation. In many cases, therefore, whether 
distributive changes will be deemed to be good for the poor will depend on the manner in 
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Figure 3: Unidimensional poverty dominance curves using Tunisian Povcal Lorenz 
ordinates of 1995, Tunisian National Institute of Statistics (2007) Lorenz ordinates of 
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Figure 4: Bidimensional growth dominance curves using Tunisian Povcal Lorenz 
ordinates of 1995, Tunisian National Institute of Statistics (2007) Lorenz ordinates of 
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Figure 5: Unidimensional poverty dominance curves using Mauritanian Povcal Lorenz 
ordinates of 1995, Mauritanian Ministry of Economics and Development (2006) Lorenz 
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Figure 6: Bidimensional growth dominance curves using Mauritanian Povcal Lorenz 
ordinates of 1995, Mauritanian Ministry of Economics and Development (2006) Lorenz 
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Figure 7: Unidimensional poverty dominance curves using Iranian Povcal Lorenz 
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Figure 8: Bidimensional growth dominance curves using Iranian Povcal Lorenz ordinates 
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Figure 9: Unidimensional poverty dominance curves using Yemenite Povcal Lorenz 
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Figure 10: Bidimensional growth dominance curves using Yemenite Povcal Lorenz 
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Figure 11: Unidimensional poverty dominance curves using Turkish Povcal Lorenz 
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Figure 12: Bidimensional growth dominance curves using Turkish Povcal Lorenz 
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Figure 13: Unidimensional poverty dominance curves using Egyptian Povcal Lorenz 
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Figure 14: Bidimensional growth dominance curves using Egyptian Povcal Lorenz 
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Figure 15: Unidimensional poverty dominance curves using Jordanian Povcal Lorenz 
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Figure 16: Bidimensional growth dominance curves using Jordanian Povcal Lorenz 






























Relative poverty line 
  33
Figure 17: Unidimensional poverty dominance curves using Moroccan Povcal Lorenz 
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Figure 18: Bidimensional growth dominance curves using Moroccan Povcal Lorenz 
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Figure 19: Unidimensional poverty dominance curves using Syrian El-Laithy and Abu-
Ismail's (2005) Lorenz ordinates 1996/7-2003/4, and the procedure of Shorrocks and 
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Figure 20: Bidimensional growth dominance curves using Syrian El-Laithy and Abu-
Ismail's (2005) Lorenz ordinates 1996/7-2003/4, and the procedure of Shorrocks and 
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